Ransomware trends, incident response overview and preventative best practices

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Ransomware activity in 2020 proves that threat actors are only getting bolder and more sophisticated every day. The number of ransomware attacks and ransomware demands have skyrocketed in the past two years.

A company’s best defense against an attack is prevention in the form of employee training, two-factor email authentication and frequent data backups, among others.

It is not recommended that a company or its employees directly contact the attacker. Instead, immediately contact your cyber insurance carrier and engage legal counsel.

In this update, Mullen Coughlin LLC and Tracepoint are pleased to team up to provide the latest ransomware trends, an overview of the incident response process and best practices to prevent cyber-related incidents at your organization.

2020 RANSOMWARE TRENDS

Attacks on third-party service and managed-service providers

Third-party and Managed Services Providers (MSPs) that host their clients’ data — even when encrypted (locked) — can be a conduit for threat actors to encrypt the MSP clients’ data, or to access and infect the clients’ networks with ransomware through live remote connections. Both parties pose similar, but different, risks to clients.

Some third-party providers retain data on behalf of their clients. In the event of an incident, it is still ultimately the responsibility of the client, if they are the owner of the data, to notify individuals whose data may be impacted by an incident.

Therefore, organizations should be aware of the obligations these third-party providers have to them and, ultimately, the risks associated with data being retained by an outside entity.

MSPs have also been a consistent target of attack. Similar to third-party providers, MSPs may have a duty to their clients based on the data they retain.

As such, organizations should be advised to review their contracts with MSPs and other service providers for any obligations between the parties. In addition, clients should be aware that in the event of an MSP or third-party provider incident, their systems and servers may also be at risk.

Ransomware can spread to the MSP client’s network through a live remote connection.

Recently, ConnectWise Control, formerly ScreenConnect, fell victim to fraudulent technical support technicians who tricked users into installing the software and permitting a live and open connection to where the ransomware could be deployed.

We’ve seen similar attacks perpetrated via Ammyy Admin, AnyDesk and TeamViewer.

Once inside the network, ransomware threat groups may disable endpoint monitoring software. The threat actors may also do reconnaissance to assess the infrastructure and determine the quickest way to cripple the majority of the environment with ransomware.

The threat actor may also exfiltrate data, including personal information, from names to addresses, birth dates, Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, health information and sensitive company information, prior to deployment of the ransomware.

Fortunately, exfiltration of stolen data does not, in all cases, equate to its publication.

In nearly every ransomware attack, however, the bad actor demands a ransom in exchange for a decryption tool and a promise to delete and not publish stolen data. The ransom amounts by threat actors continue to increase.

According to ransomware incident response platform provider Coveware, Inc. (Coveware), both the average and median ransom payment have increased dramatically since Q4 2018, until Q4 2020, when payments decreased.¹
ANATOMY OF A RANSOMWARE ATTACK: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW IF YOU FALL VICTIM

The attack: Common entry points and infiltration tactics

Ransomware can infiltrate a network from a variety of sources.

The three most common access points are:

1. Email links (phishing);
2. Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP); and

According to Coveware, phishing emails have surpassed RDP attacks as the most common attack vector. In an email phishing attack, bad actors obtain login credentials to an administrator or other such privileged account via use of phishing techniques.

From there, they can unlock network-wide systems to propagate the ransomware. This is the typical practice of certain well-known threat actor groups including Conti, Netwalker, Sodinokibi, Dopplepaymer and Lockbit.

In an RDP attack, threat actors gain access to an organization’s network by “brute force” exploitation of publicly available or weak credentials. Once inside, they deploy executable malware and/or ransomware.

While schools, municipalities and healthcare facilities are ideal targets for these types of attacks, any organization with large networks and vast amounts of sensitive data, but may not have the most current versions of software running and the deepest bench of internal and external technology resources, will be a prime target of the threat actors utilizing RDP to gain access to their victim’s organizations.

In a VPN attack, threat actors identify and then exploit unsecured and unpatched remote access VPN services. Once they gain access to the network and establish a foothold, they deploy their malware and/or ransomware.

YOUR COMPANY’S DATA IS COMPROMISED: NOW WHAT?

When a company experiences a ransomware attack, a “read me” file or a ransom note is found on servers or files. Ransom
notes typically contain the threat actor’s contact information on a ToR site or an email address. They also may discuss a demand amount and/or a statement about whether or not the data was stolen.

It is not recommended that a company or its employees directly contact the attacker. Instead, immediately contact your cyber insurance carrier and engage legal counsel. Your legal counsel will coordinate and engage a third-party cyber forensics team to begin the incident response and investigation.

Counsel may also assist in engaging a remediation team to help restore systems from backups and deploy investigation tools, such as triage scripts and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools.

Counsel will also assist in law enforcement notification.

If communication with the threat actor is identified to be an appropriate step in the incident response process, the communication strategy will be established via discussions amongst several stakeholders in the ransomware incident response process, including the victim organization, counsel, cyber insurance carrier, forensics, and ransomware negotiation firm if forensics does not provide this service.

The communication strategy will be borne out of identification of the impact of the event on the victim organization’s business operations, need for the decryption key, and threat intelligence on the threat actor group claiming responsibility for the ransomware attack.

Throughout the investigation into the nature and scope of the incident, counsel will identify applicable legal and contractual obligations of the organization to document and/or disclose the event and organization’s response to the incident and assist in fulfilling such obligations.
LEVERAGING YOUR DATA BACKUPS
Data backups can make or break a ransomware situation. Backups not accessed or compromised by the ransomware threat actor can be used to restore your access to lost or encrypted data.

Often it takes less time to restore from a backup than it would to negotiate with the attacker and pay a ransom demand to obtain decryption tools or keys, and then use the tools or keys to regain access to your information.

When considering this route, your organization should weigh the cost of the ransom against three important factors:

1. How long it will take to restore data from the backup;
2. The potential data exposure; and
3. The effect of the attack on day-to-day operations.

In some instances, you may be left with no other option than to pay ransom, either because the threat actors targeted your backups, or your backups do not exist.

Organizations may also opt to pay a ransom due to the cost of restoration or because the attacker claims to have stolen the data and the organization wants to avoid publication of the data.

COMMUNICATING WITH THREAT ACTORS
Engaging with experienced legal counsel and a third-party forensic investigator is critical when negotiating with ransomware threat actors.

If communication with the threat actor is determined by the stakeholders to be a step in the ransomware incident response process, the forensic investigator or negotiation firm will first communicate with the threat actor to determine three important elements:

1. The amount and currency of the demand;
2. The threat actor has the proper decryption tool (key) to recover the encrypted data; and
3. The status of the data. Has it been stolen? Could it be publicized?

The investigator will also request a “proof of life” by providing sample encrypted files from the victim organization that do not contain sensitive data to the threat actor.

This it to establish whether they are able to decrypt (unlock) the data with the offered tools in exchange for the ransom payment.

If any data has been stolen, the organization must understand what data was stolen, including to whom it relates and to whom it belongs. This could result in obligations to notify affected parties according to applicable state, federal, international or industry-specific statutes.

PAYING RANSOM: KNOW BEFORE YOU PAY
Before making payment to a threat actor, the forensic investigator or payment vendor should, in all cases, run an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) check to confirm that the ransom payment is not being sent to an individual or an account associated with a sanctioned country, individual or program:

On October 1, 2020, OFAC issued an Advisory noting that self-initiated, timely and complete reporting of a ransomware attack is a significant mitigating factor in determining an appropriate law enforcement outcome if the situation is later determined to be connected to a sanctioned group.

The vendor making the payment — whether the forensic investigator or negotiation firm — will manually review several sources of threat intelligence to determine whether
there is evidence to believe the person or persons receiving the payment is sanctioned or associated with a sanctioned entity or individual.

Those sources include, at a minimum:

- Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) published by OFAC;
- Consolidated List of Persons, Groups and Entities Subject to Financial Sanctions published by the European Union (EU); and
- Security Council Consolidated List published by the United Nations (UN).

OFAC checks should be performed in congruence with a thorough examination of threat intelligence, including a review of indicators of compromise, a review of IP addresses involved in the event, a review of other proprietary threat intelligence and a review of open source threat intelligence.

Timely notification to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) should also be considered.

Entities involved in making the ransom payment will not be sanctioned when a confirmed OFAC clearance is received.

However, OFAC function under strict liability standards and sanctions could ensue if it is determined after payment is made that a sanctioned country, entity, individual or program received payment.

In addition to the OFAC’s guidance, there are two more regulatory advisories that should be read in conjunction with OFAC’s when determining if a ransom payment can be made and what steps must be taken when doing so: (1) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) 10/1/20 “Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments” and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 10/8/20 “Cryptocurrency: An Enforcement Framework” (the Framework).

FinCEN’s advisory notes that, depending on the facts, the facilitation of the payment of a ransom (whether in virtual currency such as Bitcoin, or fiat currency) by digital forensic and incident response (DFIR) companies, as well as cyber insurance companies (CICs), could be considered money transmission.

Therefore, DFIRs would be obligated to register as a money service business (MSB) with FinCEN, and, along with CICs, may be required to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). The DOJ’s Framework, published by the Attorney General’s Cyber-Digital Task Force, confirms the FinCEN advisory that MSBs are to be regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).

Additionally, the Framework outlines the number of federal and international crimes that an MSB can contribute to should they facilitate the payment of a ransom (particularly in the form of a virtual currency such as Bitcoin).

Finally, the Framework outlines other regulatory agencies that the DOJ works with in identifying and combating individuals and groups who use cryptocurrency or virtual currency for illicit purposes:

1. FinCEN;
2. OFAC;
3. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC);
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
5. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC);
6. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and
7. State-specific agencies and authorities.

Through any of these agencies, the DOJ has authority to address and/or prosecute a MSB that supports nefarious or potentially nefarious cryptocurrency transactions.

Legal counsel will advise an organization during the investigation of a duty to notify, whether under state, federal or international law or pursuant to a contractual requirement.

Usually within a few hours after payment, the threat actor will provide the decryption key. Each ransomware threat actor group operates differently.

Some provide a universal key, while others require unique keys for each system/server that is encrypted. In some instances, ransomware threat actor groups provide “customer service support” to assist if the key provided is not working.

**DECRYPTING YOUR DATA: WHAT TO EXPECT**

Once a threat actor provides the key, the forensic investigator will test it to ensure it decrypts the data and does not contain any additional malware. The forensic investigator then provides the key to the affected organization.

The decryption process is not instantaneous, but often a multi-day process involving the unlocking of all encrypted systems and files. The forensic investigator, with the assistance of remediation teams and an organization’s own IT/IS department, will assist in the process.

It is important to note that the key may not be able to recover all of the compromised files. Certain files may be corrupted
(either by the encryption or decryption) and unrecoverable as a result of the ransomware event.

BEFORE YOU CLOSE THE INCIDENT, INVESTIGATE AND DOCUMENT IT
During the ransomware incident response process, a forensic investigator will conduct an investigation into the root cause of the attack.

The forensic investigation focuses on creating a timeline of the incident to document:

• How the attacker got into the network;
• Where the attacker went while within the network or connected to the network;
• What other malware, if any, was deployed by the threat actor while within the environment;
• What data was/may have been accessed;
• What data was/may have been stolen/acquired; and
• What persistent “back doors” may be available for future attackers.

This investigation is conducted under the direction of legal counsel, who will review the findings and timeline and advise the organization of its legal requirements arising from the incident.

COMMUNICATE ACCURATELY AND EFFECTIVELY
In the immediate wake of discovery of a ransomware attack, while organizations are working to understand the impact and scope of the incident, they will often receive questions from employees, business partners, customers and the media.

Legal counsel, and public relation firms in certain circumstances, will help the organization address these questions and assist with abiding by state, federal, international and contractual obligations in the process.

It is critical that the organization respond to these questions timely and accurately, free of assumptions or speculation about what happened.

Organizations can direct the tone and cadence of their communications to fit the company culture, but counsel and public relations will play an important role in advising organizations if a proposed message could create undue concern or unnecessary questions from the recipients.

NOTIFY PERSUANT TO LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Legal counsel will advise an organization during the investigation of a duty to notify, whether under state, federal or international law or pursuant to a contractual requirement (e.g., a business associate agreement between organizations involved in healthcare).

The forensic investigation is necessary as legal counsel needs to be advised on whether sensitive information was accessed or exfiltrated by the threat actor.

Prevention is an organization’s best defense against long-term business interruption and risk exposure.

Legal counsel will have acute knowledge and experience navigating the patchwork of state, federal and international laws and regulations. Counsel can also review contracts and advise if notice under a contract is necessary.

PREVENTION IS YOUR BEST DEFENSE AGAINST RANSOMWARE
Prevention is an organization’s best defense against long-term business interruption and risk exposure.

Use the following toolkit to mitigate your risk:

• Train employees to detect and report phishing emails and other social engineering tactics
• Ensure software is up-to-date and any vulnerabilities are patched
• Regularly test and implement anti-virus software, firewalls and EDR solutions
• Patch and update VPNs
• Enable multi-factor authentication and integrate strong passwords on all business email accounts and remote access
• Limit the creation, and use, of privileged accounts
• Implement complex password requirements and frequent changing of passwords
• Require privileged account holders to use the accounts under only certain circumstances, and otherwise utilize an account without escalated permissions for everyday network access
• Understand where sensitive data resides and implement strong access controls to limit access to such information to authorized recipients
• Back up data regularly and store copies off-site or in cloud using the “3-2-1” method: 3 copies of critical data backed up in 2 locations, 1 of them offline
CONCLUSION
Bad actors are growing bolder and their malicious activity shows no signs of slowing. Do not try to respond to an incident without help from experts who understand and have addressed today’s most advanced threats.

Following these three rules will limit your financial exposure and save your company from reputational damage and legal action:

(1) Arm your organization with the preventative training and resources to protect your data and limit your risk.

(2) Back up your data and ensure its viability often. It’s easier to implement a backup restoration than negotiate with an attacker and pay a ransom.

(3) Know who to call for support immediately after a threat or incident is detected to ensure you respond as quickly as possible. Call your cyber insurance carrier or broker and engage legal counsel who will secure a cyber forensics team to begin the incident response and investigation processes.

Notes
1 Ransomware Payments Fall as Fewer Companies Pay Data Extortion Demands (https://bit.ly/2RL3bQR), Coveware, Inc. (02/01/2021)
2 RDP is a technical standard for using a desktop computer remotely.
3 A VPN creates a private network from any public internet connection. They mask your IP address and also establish secure and encrypted connections to provide greater privacy than a secured Wi-Fi hotspot.
4 A Tor site is a website accessed through an open-source Tor browser that enables anonymous communication and browsing. Using a Tor site makes it more difficult to be tracked by third-parties and is often used as the “dark web.”
5 EDR is a cyber technology that focuses on detecting and investigating suspicious activity, and then notifying the end-user of any found threats and providing them with a list of preventative actions.
7 https://bit.ly/3xXc3U5
8 A MSB is required by the BSA to file a SAR if a transaction of $5,000 or more (in funds and/or assets) is conducted or attempted and involves, among others, funds derived from illegal activity. When filing a SAR regarding suspicious cyber-related activity, including ransomware, the MSB should include all relevant information about the event, including the cyber-related information and other technical indicators.

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